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Abstract-
 
Cryptography is the background of protecting the 
flowed information between various communicated parties. 
Quantum cryptography gives the extreme trust to transferred 
information by creating a unique secret key that is based upon 
the law of physics. This paper will discuss a novel algorithm 
that is presented through quantum key distribution (QKD) 
protocol. This QKD protocol depends on parallel quantum 
communications between participants within EPR and 
quantum channels. The proposed protocol utilizes the EPR 
channel to prove the authentication while the quantum channel 
to transfer the shared key. Moreover, the proposed protocol 
initiates the verification of the participant’s identity between the 
communicators by the EPR channel. After that the transferred 
data
 
into quantum channel will create the secret key that 
contains a string of qubits as well as no need to communicate 
into classical channel.
 
Keywords: entangled states, epr pair paradox, intercept-
resend attack (IRA), open-key string (OKS), and pauli-
matrices measurement.
 
I.
 
Introduction
 
ccording to several studies in the quantum 
cryptography, approving the stability of quantum 
key distribution protocol (QKDP) is based upon 
resisting the QKD protocol to quantum security attacks. 
These attacks have different algorithms and 
mechanisms that are generally used to tap or eavesdrop 
transferred data between various parties.  The robust 
scenario in using quantum cryptography is its 
independency to utilize the law of physics through the 
quantum channel, which can detect an error as long as 
it occurs
 
during an eavesdropper or fiber-optics noise.  
For instance, Intercept-Resend-Attack (IRA) is the well-
known quantum attack that threatens the submitted 
photons from the sender to the receiver (Acín, 
 
Masanes, & Gisin, 2003; Curty
 
&
 
Lütkenhaus, 2005). In 
this scenario, Eve will mask itself as one of the legal 
parties where she will measure the first particle of the 
submitted entangled state, and she will try to resend the 
new created qubit back to Bob. First, the EPR pairs are 
anticipated to be located with Alice and Bob, but Eve will 
not be detected at first check. However, because of the 
property of EPR pairs, Eve will be detected during the 
second error check that is because EPR pairs have 
collapsed (Li & Zhang, 2006; Long & Liu, 2002).   
The majority of QKD protocols face a difficulty 
of identity’s determination, where the communicators 
sometimes are not exactly sure who is the sender (or the 
receiver). Several quantum attacks take this advantage 
of missed identification between the communicated 
parties. Therefore, the run time execution will suffer a 
delay due to much time to restart a new communication 
or errors correction, every time when the participants 
find a noise in the quantum channel. On the other hand, 
the shared data will be lacked if the connected parties 
ignore the error rate that usually happens during many 
quantum attacks. 
Furthermore, using an authentication procedure 
at the beginning of the communication between two or 
more parties will rise the security rate of data 
transmission. It can also avoid the Intercept-Resend 
Attack (IRA) or Man-In-Middle Attack (MIM) (Gao, Qin, 
Guo, & Wen, 2011; Peev et al., 2005) that are based 
upon impersonating the sender or receiver or both.  On 
the other hand, making a separation between the 
authentication phase (e.g. EPR channel) and the data 
submission stage (e.g. Quantum channel) will increase 
the live time execution that causes a chance for Eve to 
catch or interrupt even a few communication qubits. 
Therefore, merging the authentication and the 
submission of data have the possibility to reduce any 
eavesdropping chance. 
This paper will introduce a new quantum key 
distribution algorithm, which uses the two quantum 
channels to ful fil the authentication between the 
participants by EPR channel. Then the quantum channel 
will be prepared at the same time of EPR 
communications to submit a qubits (secret key data). 
There will be early decision available to both 
communicators to finish or keep the connection. First 
part of this paper will demonstrate the initiation of EPR 
and Quantum channels, and then will show the 
measurement techniques that will be used at the 
receiver side. 
II. THE INITIATION OF THE EPR CONNECTION 
In 2015, a quantum key distribution algorithm 
(Abushgra &Elleithy, 2015) was presented, where it was 
designed to be robust against common quantum 
attacks.  One such quantum attack was the Man-In-
Middle (MIM) attack, which causes an enormous leak of 
A
 
Author α: He is PhD candidate at Computer Science and Engineering 
Department, University of Bridgeport.  
e-mail: aabushgr@my.bridgeport.edu
Author σ: He is Professor at Computer Science and Engineering 
Department, University of Bridgeport. e-mail: elleithy@bridgeport.edu
G
lo
ba
l 
Jo
ur
na
l 
of
 C
om
pu
te
r 
Sc
ie
nc
e 
an
d 
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
  
  
  
 V
ol
um
e 
X
V
I 
Is
su
e 
 V
 V
er
sio
n 
I 
  
  
 
  
1
Y
e
a
r
20
16
  
 (
)
E
© 2016   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
data into the quantum communication between Alice 
and Bob. The proposed protocol prevents the MIM 
attack according to the rules of MIM attacks.  The MIM 
attack relies on the fact that the MIM attack will lie or 
pretend to be a sender or a receiver to both legitimate 
parties (Yong, Huadeng, Zhaohong, &Jinxiang, 2009). 
Moreover, the MIM attacker plays on the weaknesses of 
verification identities between the communicated 
participants. 
The proposed protocol is initiated by a 
communication into the EPR channel, where Alice (or 
third party) submits a string of entangled states |├𝛹𝛹±⟩  𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 |├𝛷𝛷±⟩ as well as an unknown state|├𝜑𝜑⟩. The 
unknown state is considered to be the identification 
state, where the identification state includes initiated 
strings of time t1, size of matrix m, and number of 
matrices n, parity strings p, number of states s, raw 
index R, and determinate time t2. The EPR 
communication will not take a long time of execution 
because the string of entangled states should be sent in 
short. After that Bob measures the upcoming string 
based on EPR theory (Entangled states) (Bell, 1964; 
Ekert, 1991; Li & Chen, 2007), and then after tensor EPR 
state (in random) with unknown state (Alice knows) Bob 
receives a separate code to apply the proper gate, 
which are one of the quantum gate (x, y, and z gates). 
Bob will use these gates to measure the states in the 
superposition. Next, Alice now knows that Bob had 
received a portion of the right qubits if the percentage of 
matched qubits is over 70%. Hence, Alice starts 
negotiations with Bob to make sure there is no 
eavesdropper. If Alice finds the matched qubits less 
than 70%, she will announce Bob to restart another 
communication. 
In case, Alice accepts the EPR communication 
outcomes, she will submit the string of qubits (data) as 
in (Abushgra & Elleithy, 2015) into the quantum channel. 
When Alice initiates the quantum communication within 
the quantum channel, she knows that Bob has already 
produced Open-Keys such as (t1, n, m, s, p, R, and t2). 
On the other side, Bob measures the upcoming qubits 
based on the number of states (s). He will have 
enormous amount of measured qubits, where these 
qubits will be reset in a number of matrices (n) based 
upon the raw index (R). After that Bob inserts the parity 
diagonal string (p) into the matrix to start correcting the 
error phase. If the total of matrix raw summation was 
even, it means there is no interruption. On the other 
hand, if the total of the matrix raw was odd, Bob will 
initiate reconciliation phase. 
 
𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = {𝑠𝑠1, 𝑚𝑚, 𝑠𝑠, 𝑝𝑝, 𝑠𝑠, 𝑅𝑅, 𝑠𝑠2}. 
 
 
Fig.1 : Shows the initiated open-key string that will be 
submitted by Alice to Bob through EPR channel.
 
 
Fig.
 
2
 
: Shows the proposed scheme between two 
legitimate parties (A and B).
 
The submitted Open-Key (OK) string provides 
the authentication by EPR entangled states, where each 
photon is prepared by the sender or third party to be 
merged with an unknown state (e.g. two dimension 
state). Measuring an electron at the same time gives an 
opposite result at each participant’s side by 
conservation of linear momentum (Hwang & Lee, 2007). 
Therefore, these electrons are employed in the 
authentication phase because physically the photons 
that represent the Open-Key travel faster than the light 
speed. Moreover, the Open-Key string in the proposed 
protocol includes the following characters that are used 
to authenticate the communication between Alice and 
Bob as follows: 
• t1 is the initiated time. 
• n is the used matrices that can be any number (i = 1, 
2,… N). 
• m represents the size of the matrix (or matrices) that 
must be (a = b). 
• p is the string of parity diagonal, which it should be 
prepared simultaneously with EPR connection. 
• s is the number of states that are bounded in two 
types: orthogonal states, or non-orthogonal states. 
• R is the row indices sequentially. 
• t2 is termination time. 
These characters must be submitted into the 
Open-Key (OK) string by the EPR channel, and both of 
the participants should know the included qubits by the 
theory of entangled states. To measure the upcoming 
qubits, it is necessary to use the Pauli-Matrices 
(𝜎𝜎𝑥𝑥 ,𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦 ,𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝜎𝜎𝑧𝑧)(Shor & Preskill, 2000) in Bob’s circuit’s 
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Simultaneous Initiating EPR and Quantum Channel by Quantum Key Distribution Protocol
side. Moreover, when Alice desires to share a classical 
bit 0 with Bob, she initiates the EPR pairs in the state of 
| Φ ∓⟩. Also, Alice creates |  Ψ ∓⟩ state, if she wants to 
share classical bit 1(Li & Zhang, 2006). |  𝜑𝜑⟩ = 𝛼𝛼|  0⟩ + 𝛽𝛽|  1⟩                                  𝑈𝑈𝑠𝑠𝑈𝑈𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑈𝑈𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 
| Ψ ∓⟩ = 1
√2 (|  0⟩ |  0⟩  ∓  |  1⟩ |  1⟩)  𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 
| Φ ∓⟩ = 1
√2 (|  0⟩ |  1⟩  ∓  |  1⟩ |  0⟩)    𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠. 
Hence, the submitted particle should be 
initiated in the previous entangled state, where the 
position of eigenstate in the |  ∅ ∓⟩ are first |  0⟩, |  1⟩ and 
second |  0⟩, |  1⟩. Then Alice keeps one of the qubits in her 
quantum memory and submits the other qubits into EPR 
channel. To figure out how the size of the used matrix 
(or matrices), Bob must calculate the upcoming qubits 
during the EPR channel in the equation as follows: 
𝑀𝑀𝑥𝑥𝑦𝑦 =  ∑ |  𝜑𝜑𝑠𝑠⟩𝑠𝑠=1𝑅𝑅  × 𝑠𝑠. 
Based on the received qubits, Bob can organize 
the qubits into a matrix (or matrices) by the above 
equation of Mxy where the whole received qubits are put 
in the number of matrices n. Also, the∑ |  𝜑𝜑𝑠𝑠⟩𝑠𝑠=1 is an 
Open-Key string that represents the tensor of all 
received qubits. Then Bob begins multiple sequential 
steps to decide if the qubits are zero eavesdropping or 
there was a noise during the communication. 
III. THE MEASURED QUBITS INTO EPR CHANNEL 
To re-sort the proper indices in their positions, 
Bob should match the measured indices (Rj) with the 
OKP (Ri) indices, which usually will be raw by raw. The 
concluded matrix will be filled in by qubits either |  ∅ ∓⟩ 
or |  𝜑𝜑 ∓⟩ as well as the diagonal of the matrix (LEFT to 
RIGHT) that will be filled by a parity string. The parity 
string (p) is the qubits that should be located at the 
matrix’s diagonal (UP to DOWN). Later, Bob sums the 
qubits in each raw; if the summation is (0) that means 
the first correcting phase is secure. Otherwise, Bob will 
know that there is a noise or an eavesdropping when he 
finds (1) as a summation of the matrix raw. 
𝑅𝑅(𝑠𝑠) =  𝑅𝑅(𝑗𝑗 )∗  
where R is the index number  of the matrix, and 
𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 ∈ {1, 2 …𝑠𝑠}). 
 
   
 
The abovementioned security checks are not 
the only security procedures into the proposed protocol, 
where the implemented decoy states during Alice’s 
preparation is a type of security protection against MIM 
attacks. The decoy states are located in the upper-
triangle of the matrix (𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 ∈ {|  0⟩, |  1⟩, |  𝜑𝜑⟩,𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎 |  ∅⟩}), where 
it has a limited tolerance to lose some qubits through 
the communication phase. 
�
𝜔𝜔11 ⋯ 𝜇𝜇1𝑗𝑗
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝜑𝜑𝑠𝑠1 ⋯ 𝜔𝜔𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠� × 𝑂𝑂𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 − 𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦 = �𝛿𝛿11 ⋯ 𝛿𝛿1𝑗𝑗⋮ ⋱ ⋮𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠1 ⋯ 𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 �, 
where |  𝜑𝜑𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 � is the real qubits that will create the key, |  𝜔𝜔𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ⟩ is the parity states that are placed diagonally in the 
matrix, |  𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 � is decoy states that usually are created 
similar to real data in random, and |  𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 � is the resorted 
matrix’s rows after the measurement by Bob (𝑠𝑠 ≠ 𝑗𝑗 ∈{1, 2 …𝑠𝑠}) as shown in figure (3). 
The submitted qubits will not be effected by 
eavesdroppers, in case, Eve tried to interrupt the 
channel. The reason of standing against any Eve’s 
interruption is involved through inability of realizing the 
real qubits of the decoy qubits. Moreover, the string of 
qubits will be such as one string of data, and there is no 
variation between each photon. 
 
 
  
   
IV. TRANSFERRED QUBITS INTO THE QUANTUM 
CHANNEL 
Alice initiates the qubits that she desires to 
share with Bob at the same time while preparing the 
EPR channel. Also, Alice should have the created qubits 
in her memory to start submitting one by one in a string 
mode. Although the participants are looking to 
exchange secure data, the EPR connection, at first, is 
used to solve the authentication phase. Moreover, both 
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Fig. 4 : Shows the prepared qubits in one matrix by 
three classifications, shared data, decoy states, and 
parity states resorted from up to down and left to right 
sequentially, where |  𝜔𝜔⟩ is the parity diagonal states, |  𝜑𝜑⟩
is the data thatwill build the secret key, and |  𝜇𝜇⟩ is the 
decoy states. (𝑠𝑠 = 𝑗𝑗 ∈ {1,2 …𝑁𝑁}).
Fig. 3 : Shows re-sorting the received rows by Bob in the 
proposed protocol between two matrices, where these 
rows were received such as one string and sequentially 
resorted in equal matrix.
parties now attempt to obtain correct data rather than 
interrupted qubits by the eavesdropper or environment 
noise. The submitted qubits will be in four states and 
two non-orthogonal bases. |  𝜑𝜑⟩ = 1
√2 (𝛼𝛼|  0⟩ + 𝛽𝛽|  1⟩),  |  ∅⟩ = 1
√2 (𝛼𝛼|  0⟩ + 𝛽𝛽|  1⟩). 
There are multiple options available to transfer a 
qubit through quantum channel and make the 
submission secure. One such option is that Alice can 
communicate with Bob in multi-states ⨁|  𝑠𝑠𝑈𝑈⟩, where Alice 
decides through the EPR channel the dimension of the 
used photon that will be submitted to Bob (e.g. two 
dimension or more). This is an optional technique that is 
used; especially, when the secret key should be created 
to match big data such as in OTP. 
Therefore, the proposed algorithm proved its 
stand against two common quantum attacks. These 
attacks as mentioned above are IRA and MIM attacks, 
which both of these attacks are still considered the most 
concerns around submitting a data through a quantum 
channel. Also, there is ability to create a huge secret key 
to match the whole data as long as the quantum 
memory is available.   
V. CONCLUSION 
The proposed QKD algorithm has proved its 
stability of trusted communication through the quantum 
channel as well as it is robust against MIM and IRA 
attacks. The protocol was built, in general, to fulfill the 
authentication between the communicated parties 
through the quantum channel. Moreover, the QKD 
protocol has employed simultaneous exchanges either 
into the EPR channel (authentication) or quantum 
channel (sharing a secret key) that maximally sustains 
the flowing of data into secure phase. As a result, the 
proposed protocol has been tested and simulated 
mathematically by MATLAB in classical system and has 
proved its security against common quantum attacks. 
Therefore, the proposed protocol is specified by using 
two parallel quantum channels to prove the 
authentication between the communicated parties 
before exchanging secret key plain-text. 
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